Distribution of public offices, political context, and Brazilian presidentialism: an institutional analysis of the discretionary system

Abstract This paper analyses the development of the discretionary system of bureaucratic positions in Brazil. On the one hand, the research literature relates the allocation of public offices to the coalitional presidential system. On the other hand, this literature pointed out initiatives aiming to professionalise the bureaucracy and strengthen state careers. In this context, the presidential dilemmas refer to choosing between seeking support from the coalition by appointing party members and controlling public policies by nominating individuals aligned with the president’s preferences. In this article, theories of institutional change are the main theoretical framework for analysing the progression of rules on appointments to public offices and their impacts on the portraits of nominees. Through a case study of Brazil, the paper assesses the congruence between theoretical predictions and empirical evidence regarding the relationship between institutions and the distribution of public sector posts. The methodology comprises bibliographic research, documental analysis, and descriptive statistics. The documentary search concentrated on the rules regarding the presidential coordination bodies and compulsory percentages of appointed career civil servants. The results demonstrated that the laws were not effective as federal public bodies did not comply with the rules. Furthermore, the quantity of career civil servants in discretionary public offices was already high before the establishment of compulsory percentages. The role of coordination bodies varied across the different administrations. Despite the centralisation of presidential power, evidence points out that public managers are partially free to choose their staff and only sometimes comply with the legal requirements. Thus, the conclusions reinforce the need to include informal institutions in further analysis. Besides promoting a contextual description of Brazil, the paper contributes to theory-testing and theory-building on the relationship between institutions and the distribution of public offices.摘要：本文剖析巴西公共官僚职位自由裁量任命体系的发展历程。一方面，既有研究文献将公共职位的分配与联合总统制（coalitional presidential system）相关联；另一方面，此类文献亦关注旨在推动官僚体系专业化、强化国家公职职业序列的各项举措。在此背景下，总统面临的两难困境在于：是通过任命本党成员以获取执政联盟支持，还是通过提名契合总统政策偏好的人选来掌控公共政策制定。本文以制度变迁理论（institutional change）为核心分析框架，剖析公共职位任命规则的演进路径及其对被任命者特征的影响。本文以巴西为案例研究对象，评估制度与公共部门职位分配之间关系的理论预测与经验证据的一致性。本研究采用的研究方法包括文献研究、档案分析与描述性统计。档案检索重点围绕总统协调机构的相关规则，以及任命职业文官的强制占比要求展开。研究结果显示，相关法律并未发挥预期效力，因为联邦公共机构并未遵守这些规则。此外，在强制占比规定出台之前，自由裁量任命的公共职位中职业文官占比已处于较高水平。总统协调机构的职能在不同政府任期内存在显著差异。尽管总统权力呈现集中化趋势，但经验证据表明，公共部门管理者拥有一定的人事任免自主权，仅会在部分情况下遵守法定要求。据此，本文结论进一步强调，后续相关分析需纳入非正式制度维度。本研究不仅为巴西公共职位分配相关议题提供了情境化描述，亦为制度与公共部门职位分配关系领域的理论检验与理论建构作出了学术贡献。