Replication Data for: "Bureaucratic Packing" in the Brazilian Amazon: How Political Competition Drives Deforestation

What accounts for subnational variation in deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon? Using satellite imagery data and a novel shift-share instrumental variable design, I explore how local political competition explains this variation. I show that municipal electoral competition causally increases deforestation, especially in the presence of more private commercial interests that deforest. I argue that competition encourages mayors to pursue the strategic non-enforcement of environmental standards to cater to such interests. Drawing on qualitative interviews and administrative data on bureaucratic appointments, I show that to achieve this end, mayors use a strategy I term "bureaucratic packing," a surge in appointments of new personnel to bypass existing personnel who may not aid the mayor's agenda. In contrast to existing theories on the use of appointments for rewarding patrons, the analysis spotlights "bureaucratic packing" as an understudied strategy used to weaken regulatory capacity. Political competition generates incentives for undermining bureaucratic capacity to allow deforestation.

巴西亚马逊地区森林砍伐的次国家层面差异由何所致？本文借助卫星影像数据与创新的移位-份额工具变量（shift-share instrumental variable）设计，探究地方政治竞争对该差异的解释作用。研究表明，市级选举竞争会通过因果机制加剧森林砍伐，在存在更多参与毁林的私人商业利益群体的地区尤为显著。本文认为，政治竞争会激励市长采取策略性放松环境标准执行的方式，以迎合此类商业利益群体。本文依托质性访谈与官僚任命行政数据，揭示市长为达成上述目标，会采用一种被本文定义为‘官僚填充（bureaucratic packing）’的策略：通过大规模新增人事任命，绕过那些不配合自身施政议程的现有官僚人员。与现有‘通过任命奖励支持者’的理论不同，本研究凸显‘官僚填充’这一此前未受充分关注的策略——其核心作用在于削弱监管能力。政治竞争会催生削弱官僚监管能力以纵容森林砍伐的激励机制。