Sequential Price Setting: Theory and Evidence from a Lab Experiment

In the Varian (1980) model of price competition, a change from simultaneous to sequential price setting dramatically changes equilibrium strategies and pay-offs, and in the unique symmetric equilibrium prices are pushed up to the monopoly price. In addition there exists an asymmetric equilibrium with lower average prices. Our main contribution is to test these predictions in the laboratory. Our experimental data strongly support the qualitative model predictions. However, there is a non-negligible fraction of players that set low prices in accordance with the asymmetric equilibrium, which is puzzling. We show that the puzzle to a large extent can be resolved by introducing competitive preferences in the model.

在范里安（Varian, 1980）的价格竞争模型中，将定价策略从同时定价改为序贯定价时，均衡策略与收益会发生显著变化；在唯一的对称均衡中，价格会被推高至垄断价格水平。此外，该模型还存在一个平均价格更低的非对称均衡。本研究的核心贡献在于在实验室环境中对上述理论预测进行检验。实验数据有力地验证了该模型的定性预测结论，但仍有不可忽略比例的参与者选择了符合非对称均衡的低价策略，这一现象令人费解。本研究表明，通过在模型中引入竞争偏好，该谜题可在很大程度上得到解释。