Institutions, credibility and crisis: the inconsistencies of Argentine exchange rate policy (1991-2006)

The purpose of this article is twofold. The first is to explain the time inconsistencies of the convertibility regime that led to the 2001 crisis. The argument suggests that the credibility requirements for convertibility induced a dynamic of legal, fiscal, financial and external commitments that increased exit costs and time inconsistencies. The second objective is to explain the tensions of the floating regime that replaced convertibility in 2002. We describe the effects of a floating exchange rate on macroeconomic imbalance and the growing tension between competitiveness and inflation.

本文兼具双重研究目标。其一为阐释引发2001年金融危机的可兑换制度（convertibility regime）的时间不一致性问题。研究表明，可兑换制度的可信度要求催生了涵盖法律、财政、金融与外部承诺的动态约束体系，推高了制度退出成本并加剧了时间不一致性。其二为阐释2002年取代可兑换制度的浮动汇率制度所面临的多重张力。本文将分析浮动汇率对宏观经济失衡的影响，以及竞争力与通胀之间日益凸显的矛盾。