Replication data for: Does the Diversionary Use of Force Threaten the Democratic Peace? Assessing the Effect of Economic Growth on Interstate Conflict, 1921- 2001

A democratic leader, anticipating a ‘‘rally ‘round the flag effect,’’ may have an incentive to divert attention from domestic economic problems by becoming involved in military conflict abroad, undermining Immanuel Kant’s prescription for ‘‘perpetual peace.’’ We assess the risk to the democratic peace by evaluating this diversionary incentive within a general dyadic model of interstate conflict, 1921–2001, using both directed and nondirected analyses. Our results indicate that economic conditions do affect the likelihood that a democracy, but not an autocracy, will initiate a fatal militarized dispute, even against another democracy. Economic growth rates sufficiently low to negate the democratic peace are, however, rare; and the behavior of five powerful democracies raises further doubts about the importance of diversions. We find no significant evidence that a bad economy makes a democratic state less likely to be targeted by others, nor does the timing of legislative elections influence the decision of democratic leaders to use force. Alth ough economic conditions affect the likelihood of a fatal dispute for democracies, the influence is sufficiently small that Kant’s hope for a more peaceful world does not seem misplaced. A copy of the article is available here http://www.bama.ua.edu/~joneal/ISQ2006_data/

一位民主国家领导人若预判会出现‘国旗效应（rally ‘round the flag effect）’，便可能有动机通过卷入海外军事冲突，转移民众对国内经济问题的注意力，这一行为实则破坏了伊曼努尔·康德（Immanuel Kant）提出的‘永久和平（perpetual peace）’构想。我们基于1921年至2001年的国家间冲突通用二元分析模型，通过定向分析与非定向分析两种方式，评估这一转嫁注意力的执政动机对民主和平论（democratic peace）构成的风险。研究结果显示，经济状况确实会影响民主国家（而非专制国家）发起造成人员死亡的军事化争端的可能性，即便争端对象是另一民主国家亦是如此。不过，足以抵消民主和平效应的极低经济增长率情况极为罕见；同时五大民主强国的行为，进一步让人对这类转嫁注意力动机的重要性产生质疑。我们未发现显著证据表明，经济不景气会降低民主国家遭到他国攻击的可能性，也未发现立法选举的时间节点会影响民主国家领导人动用武力的决策。尽管经济状况会影响民主国家卷入致命性争端的概率，但其影响程度微弱，因此康德所期望的‘更和平的世界’这一愿景似乎并未落空。本文的副本可在此获取：http://www.bama.ua.edu/~joneal/ISQ2006_data/