Replication data for: Accounting for Crises

We provide among the first empirical evidence, consistent with recent macro global game crisis models, that shows that the precision of public signals can coordinate crises. In these models, self-fulfilling crises independent of fundamentals can occur only when publicly disclosed signals of fundamentals have high precision; poor fundamentals are the sole driver of crises only in low precision settings. We exploit a key publicly disclosed signal of fundamentals, namely accounting data, for 68 currency and systemic banking crises in 17 countries. We find that precrisis accounting signals of fundamentals are significantly lower only in low-precision countries.

本研究提供了首批实证证据之一，与近期宏观全局博弈危机模型（macro global game crisis models）的结论相符，证实公共信号精度可协调危机的发生。在这类模型中，仅当基本面的公开披露信号具备高精度时，才会出现独立于基本面的自我实现型危机（self-fulfilling crises）；而当信号精度较低时，基本面疲软才是危机的唯一诱因。本研究针对17个国家发生的68次货币危机与系统性银行危机，选取了一项关键的基本面公开披露信号——即会计数据——展开分析。研究发现，仅在信号精度较低的国家中，危机前的基本面会计信号数值才会显著偏低。