Description of major parameters.

In an innovation ecosystem, the digital transformation decisions and game mechanisms of entities are paramount issues to be studied. Consequently, this study constructs a digital transformation SD evolutionary game model based on expectancy theory and Lyapunov’s first law to address the above issues. The results demonstrate the following: (1) Digital technology empowerment benefits, spillover effects, and supervision benefits are positively correlated with the willingness of the three players to engage in digital transformation; (2) Regardless of how the initial will of the players changes, the decision of the evolutionary game system is ultimately stable in (empower, transform, supervise). Compared with governments, platform centers, and nodal enterprises have a stronger will for digital transformation. However, the governments’ will is the key to the convergence speed of the game system to the equilibrium point. (3) If the static/dynamic spillover effect can cover the transformation loss, even if the transformation profits of nodal enterprises are negative, nodal enterprises will still choose the game strategy of "transformation". When the government subsidies are less than the initial value of 2, the game system has two possible strategy choices: (empower, nontransform, nonsupervise) and (empower, transform, supervise). As such, this study can fill the research gaps and address the barriers to digital transformation among stakeholders.

在创新生态系统中，各参与主体的数字化转型决策与博弈机制是亟需开展研究的核心议题。据此，本研究基于期望理论与李雅普诺夫第一定律，构建了数字化转型系统动力学（System Dynamics, SD）演化博弈模型，以解决上述研究问题。研究结果如下：（1）数字技术赋能收益、溢出效应与监管收益，均与三方参与主体的数字化转型意愿呈显著正相关关系；（2）无论三方参与主体的初始转型意愿如何变化，该演化博弈系统的决策最终将收敛至（赋能、转型、监管）这一稳态。相较于政府主体，平台中心与节点企业的数字化转型意愿更为强烈；而政府主体的意愿则是决定博弈系统收敛至均衡点速度的关键因素。（3）若静态/动态溢出效应能够覆盖转型损失，即便节点企业的转型收益为负，其仍会选择「转型」的博弈策略。当政府补贴低于初始值2时，博弈系统存在两种可能的策略稳态：（赋能、不转型、不监管）与（赋能、转型、监管）。综上，本研究能够填补相关研究空白，破解利益相关方推进数字化转型的现实障碍。