Pork barrel efficacy: the importance of budgetary amendments and allied mayors in the election of deputies

Abstract There is little consensus among empirical studies regarding the electoral effect of individual budget amendments. The present article addresses this question by using regressions with panel data to study how a deputy's amendments affect his performance in the race for re-election. In addition, a regression discontinuity is estimated to assess how the mayor's party affects the proposition and execution of the budget amendments. The results show that only amendments made as transfers to mayoral administrations generate votes, especially when the mayor belongs to the party of the legislator. In addition, a larger volume of amendments is proposed and implemented in the municipalities.

摘要 针对议员个人预算修正案的选举效应，现有实证研究尚未形成统一结论。本文采用面板数据回归方法，探究议员提交的预算修正案如何影响其连任竞选的得票表现。此外，本文通过断点回归（Regression Discontinuity）模型，评估市长所在政党对预算修正案的提出与执行产生的影响。研究结果显示，唯有以资金转拨形式提交给市政当局的预算修正案能够为议员赢得选票，尤其当市长与议员同属一个政党时，该效应更为显著。此外，各市政辖区内提出与执行的预算修正案数量均有所增加。