Replication data: Natural and Strategic Generosity as Signals of Trustworthiness

We exploit the fact that generosity and trustworthiness are highly correlated and the former can thus be a sign of the latter. Subjects decide between a generous and a mean split in a dictator game. Some of them are informed from the start that afterwards they will participate in a trust game and that their choice in the dictator game may matter; others are not informed in advance. In the trust game, before trusters decide whether or not to trust, some trustees can reveal (or conceal) only their true choice in the dictator game, while others can say to trusters, truthfully or otherwise, what they chose. We find that a generous choice made naturally by uninformed trustees and reliably revealed is more effective in persuading trusters to trust than a generous choice that could be strategic or a lie. Moreover, we find that, when they can, mean subjects lie and go on to be untrustworthy.

本研究利用了慷慨程度与可信性高度相关这一特性，因此前者可作为后者的表征指标。实验主体需在独裁者博弈（dictator game）中选择慷慨分配方案与吝啬分配方案。部分主体从实验初始便被告知，后续将参与信任博弈（trust game），且其在独裁者博弈中的选择可能会产生影响；其余主体则未提前获得此类告知。在信任博弈环节中，当信任者尚未决定是否实施信任行为前，部分受托者仅可披露（或隐瞒）其在独裁者博弈中的真实选择，而其余受托者则可向信任者如实或虚假地陈述自身的选择。本研究发现，相较于策略性选择或虚假陈述的慷慨行为，未提前知情的受托者自然做出的慷慨选择，经可靠披露后更能有效说服信任者实施信任行为。此外，本研究还发现，当有机会时，选择吝啬分配方案的主体会进行虚假陈述，并后续表现出不可信的行为。