Benchmark estimates.

This paper empirically examines the signaling role of feedback in the repeated public goods game. To eliminate the potential impact of feedback’s informative function, we test whether the provision of detailed yet redundant feedback leads to increased contributions. Our findings demonstrate that redundant information significantly promotes contributions. Given the equal informative power in both treatments, the observed increase in contributions can be attributed to the signaling effect. Furthermore, an examination of cooperative disposition heterogeneity reveals that conditional cooperators primarily utilize feedback for its informative function, while free riders primarily exploit it for its signaling function. These results offer empirical evidence of the signaling function of feedback and offer valuable insights into the design of feedback provision in repeated public goods settings.

本文通过实证检验，探讨了重复公共品博弈（repeated public goods game）中反馈的信号传递功能。为规避反馈信息性功能带来的潜在影响，本文检验了提供详尽但冗余的反馈信息是否会提升参与者的贡献水平。研究结果表明，冗余信息可显著提升参与者的贡献水平。由于两组实验处理的信息效力完全等同，观测到的贡献水平提升可归因于信号传递效应（signaling effect）。此外，针对合作偏好异质性的分析显示，条件合作者（conditional cooperator）主要利用反馈的信息性功能，而搭便车者（free rider）则主要借助反馈实现信号传递目的。本研究结果不仅为反馈的信号传递功能提供了实证支撑，同时也为重复公共品博弈场景下的反馈机制设计提供了极具价值的参考视角。