Moderating effect test I.

From the perspective of interest conflicts, this study investigates the relationship between corporate leverage manipulation and financial risk using a sample of A-share listed real estate firms in China from 2009 to 2023. Employing a two-way fixed effects model, the main findings are as follows: (1) Leverage manipulation significantly increases the level of financial risk among real estate firms; (2) Mechanism analysis reveals a collusion effect between controlling shareholders and management, as well as between external auditors and management, both of which significantly amplify the impact of leverage manipulation on financial risk. These findings support the collusion effect hypothesis and reject the monitoring effect hypothesis; (3) Heterogeneity tests show that the impact of leverage manipulation on financial risk is more pronounced in non-state-owned enterprises, in firms dominated by transactional institutional investors, and in regions with lower reliance on land finance. This study uncovers the intrinsic link between leverage manipulation and financial risk in the real estate sector and provides important policy implications for regulators aiming to improve and standardize financial risk management in the industry.本研究从利益冲突视角出发，以2009至2023年中国A股上市房地产企业为样本，探究企业杠杆操纵与财务风险之间的关联。本研究采用双向固定效应模型开展实证分析，主要研究结论如下：(1) 杠杆操纵会显著推高房地产企业的财务风险水平；(2) 机制检验揭示了控股股东与管理层、外部审计师与管理层之间的合谋效应，两类合谋均会显著放大杠杆操纵对财务风险的影响。上述研究结果支持合谋效应假说，同时否定了监督效应假说；(3) 异质性检验结果表明，杠杆操纵对财务风险的正向影响在非国有企业、交易型机构投资者主导的企业以及土地财政依赖度较低的地区更为显著。本研究揭示了房地产行业内杠杆操纵与财务风险之间的内在关联，可为旨在完善与规范行业财务风险管理的监管者提供重要的政策启示。