Presidential Particularism and Mayoral Elections

Amid the growing trend of political polarization and nationalization of US politics, the link between federal and local governments has become increasingly significant in the American public policy process. Consequently, the president, as party leader, has increasingly supported co-partisan candidates, not only in federal elections but also in subnational ones. Incorporating 1,124 contested partisan local elections for 399 cities with populations exceeding 50,000 between 2005 and 2020, we investigate how the president strategically employs federal funds to assist co-partisan mayoral candidates. Using two-way fixed effects models, we find that the president distributes more block and project grants to swing cities with co-partisan mayors during mayoral election years. We do not find, however, that the president disproportionately allocates grants to co-partisan mayors in swing cities during non-mayoral election years; instead jurisdictions are rewarded irrespective of their electoral value.

在美国政治极化与美国政治全国化趋势日益凸显的背景下，联邦政府与地方政府之间的关联在美国公共政策进程中愈发重要。因此，作为政党领袖的总统，不仅在联邦选举中，亦在地方层级选举中愈发倾向于支持同党派候选人。本研究纳入2005至2020年间美国399个人口超5万的城市的1124场存在党派竞争的地方选举，以此探究总统如何通过战略性调配联邦资金，帮扶同党派的市长候选人。本研究采用双向固定效应模型（two-way fixed effects models），发现总统会在市长选举年，向拥有同党派市长的摇摆城市拨付更多整笔拨款（block grants）与项目拨款（project grants）。但研究并未发现，在非市长选举年，总统会向摇摆城市中的同党派市长不成比例地分配拨款；相反，相关管辖区获得拨款与否，与其选举价值并无关联。