Replication data for: Legislative-Judicial Relations: A Game-Theoretic Approach to Constitutional Review

This study develops an imperfect information model of the interactions between legislatures and constitutional courts. The model addresses legislative anticipation of judicial review, legislative reactions to judicial rulings, and the impact of anticipation of such reactions on judicial behavior. The most important finding is that the nature of legislative-judicial relations depends crucially on the political environment in which court and legislature must act, as well as on judicial preferences. Several results are tested in a logit analysis of decisions by the German Constitutional Court from 1983 to 1995.

本研究构建了立法机关与宪法法院之间互动的不完全信息模型（imperfect information model）。该模型围绕三大核心内容展开：立法机关对司法审查的预判、立法机关对司法裁决的回应，以及此类预判行为对司法行为产生的影响。本研究最重要的发现为：立法与司法关系的本质，核心取决于法院与立法机关运作所处的政治环境，同时也受司法偏好的影响。此外，研究基于1983年至1995年间德国宪法法院的裁决数据，通过对数几率分析（logit analysis）对多项研究结论进行了实证检验。