Replication data for: Collusion with Asymmetric Retailers: Evidence from a Gasoline Price-Fixing Case

We point out a fundamental difficulty of successfully colluding in retail markets with heterogeneous firms, and characterize the mechanism recent gasoline cartels in Canada used to sustain collusion. Heterogeneity in cost and network size necessitates arrangements whereby participants split the market unequally to favor stronger players. We characterize empirically the strategy and transfer mechanism using court documents containing summaries and extracts of conversations between participants. The mechanism implements transfers based on adjustment delays during price changes. We estimate that these delays can translate into substantial transfers and provide examples in which they can substantially reduce deviation frequency.

本研究揭示了企业异质性零售市场中成功实施合谋的根本性难题，并阐明了加拿大近期汽油卡特尔用以维持合谋的运行机制。成本与网络规模的异质性要求合谋各方采用非均等的市场划分方案，以倾斜照顾实力更强的参与者。本研究借助收录了合谋方对话摘要与原文摘录的法庭文件，对其合谋策略与转移支付机制开展实证刻画。该机制通过价格调整过程中的延迟时长实现转移支付。经估算，此类延迟可带来规模可观的转移支付，且相关案例表明其能显著降低合谋偏离行为的发生频率。