Replication Data for: Politicised Enforcement in China: Evidence from the Enforcement of Land Laws and Regulations

Politically-motivated interference by politicians, or "politicised enforcement", is a common cause of enforcement failure in many countries. Existing research on politicised enforcement has focused largely on incentives driven by electoral competition, while fewer studies analysed its mechanisms in an authoritarian context. Drawing on the case of China, this paper develops the argument that politicised enforcement can be a consequence of the strategies adopted by authoritarian ruling elites to maintain political survival. Using a panel data set on the enforcement of land laws and regulations, the empirical analysis suggests that the intensity of enforcement correlates with economic performance and patron-client ties between central leaders and local officials, suggesting that political imperatives faced by ruling elites to promote economic growth and carry out clientelistic exchanges affect government decisions on enforcement. Moreover, these correlations remain robust after the implementation of reforms that promoted administrative centralisation within the enforcement agency, suggesting that politicised enforcement reflects the strategic behaviour of the ruling elites of the Party. These findings contribute to the literature on enforcement in authoritarian regimes broadly and in China specifically.

政客出于政治动机实施的干预，即政治化执法（politicised enforcement），是诸多国家执法失败的常见诱因。现有关于政治化执法的研究大多聚焦于选举竞争催生的激励机制，而针对威权语境下其运作机理的探讨则较为匮乏。本文以中国为案例，提出核心论点：政治化执法或为威权统治精英为维系政治存续所采取策略的产物。本文采用土地法律法规执法领域的面板数据集开展实证分析，结果显示执法强度与经济绩效，以及中央领导人与地方官员间的庇护关系均存在相关性，这表明统治精英为推动经济增长、开展庇护式交换所面临的政治要务，会影响政府的执法决策。此外，在执法机构内部推行行政集权化改革后，上述相关性依然保持稳健，这表明政治化执法实则反映了中国共产党统治精英的策略性行为。本研究结论可为威权政体乃至中国本土的执法研究领域提供学术增量。