BELIEF AS AN ACT OF REASON

Abstract Most philosophers assume (often without argument) that belief is a mental state. Call their view the orthodoxy. In a pair of recent papers, Matthew Boyle has argued that the orthodoxy is mistaken: belief is not a state but (as I like to put it) an act of reason. I argue here that at least part of his disagreement with the orthodoxy rests on an equivocation. For to say that belief is an act of reason might mean either (i) that it’s an actualization of its subject’s rational capacities or (ii) that it’s a rational activity (hence, a certain kind of event). And, though belief is not an act of reason in the second sense, it may nonetheless be one in the first: it may be a static actualization of its subject’s rational capacities.摘要 多数哲学家往往未提供论证便预设信念为一种心理状态。我们可将该立场称作正统观点。在近期发表的两篇论文中，马修·博伊尔（Matthew Boyle）指出正统观点实为谬误：信念并非心理状态，而是（依笔者之见）一种理性行动。本文将论证，其与正统观点的分歧至少部分源于一词多义所引发的混淆。因为“信念是一种理性行动”这一表述可被理解为两种含义：其一，它是认知主体理性能力的现实化；其二，它是一项理性活动（因而属于特定类型的事件）。尽管信念并非第二种意义上的理性行动，但它却可符合第一种意义上的理性行动的定义：即它是认知主体理性能力的静态现实化。