Replication Data for: Domestic Institutions, Geographic Concentration, and Agricultural Liberalization

One of the persistent obstacles to trade liberalization is a government’s inability to commit and deliver compensation to trade losers. We argue that constitutional structures interact with the geographic profiles of industries to shape a government’s ability to commit to a compensation contract, defined as an interbranch contract whereby an executive branch promises compensation in exchange for legislative support for ratification. Our theory predicts that parliamentary systems are more likely to liberalize and compensate geographically concentrated industries because party leaders enforce a contract with a smaller number of legislators. Presidential systems are more likely to liberalize and compensate geographically diffused industries because legislature enforces a contract with a larger number of legislators. Using novel product-level data on agricultural trade liberalization and remote-sensed cropland in 38 democracies, we find evidence consistent with our argument. Qualitative studies of the sugar industry and interviews with policymakers provide further evidence.

贸易自由化进程面临的长期阻碍之一，便是政府无法做出承诺并向贸易受损方发放补偿。本文认为，宪政体制与产业地理分布特征相互作用，会影响政府兑现补偿契约的能力——此类补偿契约被定义为跨部门契约：行政部门承诺提供补偿，以换取立法部门对法案批准的支持。本理论预测，议会制国家更倾向于对地理集中型产业推进贸易自由化并提供补偿，因为政党领袖只需与较少数量的议员执行契约；总统制国家则更倾向于对地理分散型产业推进贸易自由化并提供补偿，因为立法部门需与更多数量的议员执行契约。本文使用涵盖38个民主国家的农业贸易自由化产品级数据与遥感耕地数据开展实证分析，所得结果与本文的核心论点相符。针对制糖业的质性研究与对政策制定者的访谈，进一步验证了本文的结论。