Replication Data for: The Logic of Authoritarian Political Selection: Evidence from a Conjoint Experiment in China

Political selection is important to authoritarian regime survival. Although selection outcomes are often observed, it is difficult to decipher elites’ logic of decision-making due to their multidimensional preference and the opaque process. Employing a conjoint experiment conducted among over 300 government officials in China, this paper unpacks multidimensional elite preference in entry-level political selection. It finds that while elites comply with institutional norms by selecting candidates based on competence and loyalty, they also take into account personal preference by favoring those with political connections. Kinship ties to government increase a candidate’s chance by over 20 percentage points, even though the candidate is not deemed more competent or loyal. These findings demonstrate that authoritarian elites do not always follow the logic of regime survival; there exists an agency problem in political selection that could undermine the effectiveness of the ruling class over time.

政治选拔对于威权政权的存续至关重要。尽管选拔结果通常可被观测，但由于精英群体的多维偏好与选拔流程的不透明性，我们很难厘清精英的决策逻辑。本文基于在中国300余名政府官员中开展的联合实验（conjoint experiment），拆解了入门级政治选拔中的精英多维偏好。研究发现，尽管精英会基于能力与忠诚度选拔候选人以遵循制度规范，但同时也会因个人偏好青睐拥有政治关联的候选人。与政府官员的亲属关联可使候选人的当选概率提升逾20个百分点，即便该候选人并未被认为更具能力或忠诚度。上述研究结果表明，威权体制下的精英并非始终遵循政权存续的逻辑；政治选拔中存在的委托代理问题（agency problem）可能会在长期内削弱统治阶层的治理效能。