Data-L-1.csv

When female directors, often a minority on corporate boards, introduce divergent behaviors and perspectives, they have the potential to uniquely influence board decision-making, including CEO pay raises. However, the mere addition of a female director does not guarantee the effectiveness of her minority influence. Leveraging insights from the minority influence literature and board gender diversity research, this study examines the conditions that enhance or diminish the influence of a newly appointed female director on CEO pay raises. Using data from 5,429 firm-year observations across 795 S&P 1500 firms from 2010 to 2017, we find that the appointment of a new female director is associated with a more substantial decrease in CEO pay (i.e., a stronger influence) in boards with higher incumbent female representation (as opposed to mere token representation), fewer interlocking directorships held by males, the presence of a female CEO, and more frequent membership changes among male directors. This research contributes to the ongoing dialogue on gender diversity in corporate leadership and addresses public concerns about excessive CEO compensation.

通常在公司董事会中属于少数群体的女性董事，若能提出差异化的行为范式与观点，则有可能对董事会决策（包括首席执行官（CEO）薪酬调整）产生独特影响。然而，仅新增一名女性董事，并不足以确保其少数派影响力能够发挥实效。本研究借鉴少数派影响力相关文献与董事会性别多样性领域的研究成果，考察了能够强化或削弱新任女性董事对CEO薪酬调整影响力的各类情境条件。本研究使用2010年至2017年间795家标普1500（S&P 1500）成分股公司的5429个公司年度观测样本数据，研究发现：当董事会现有女性董事占比更高（而非仅为象征性代表（token representation））、男性董事所持有的连锁董事席位（interlocking directorships）更少、存在女性CEO，且男性董事的成员变更更为频繁时，新任女性董事的任命与CEO薪酬的更大幅度下降（即更强的影响力）显著相关。本研究为当前关于公司领导层性别多样性的学术对话贡献了新的洞见，同时回应了公众对CEO薪酬过高的担忧。