The Rise Predicts the Fall: How the Method of Leader Entry Affects the Method of Leader Removal in Dictatorships

How does the way a nondemocratic leader takes power affect the stability of their government? Prior research argues that irregular leader entries—those that violate the regime's norms for leader selection—are especially likely to foreshadow subsequent unconstitutional transitions. This article contends that some forms of irregular leader entry can actually protect leaders from subsequently being forcibly removed from office. When leaders use a strong and loyal coalition of supporters to overthrow not only their predecessors, but their entire ruling regimes, they demonstrate their strength to any potential rivals. Thus, leaders that gain power through, for example, successful rebellions, popular uprisings, and major regime-changing coups, deter subsequent challenges. They are substantially less likely to be ousted than leaders who take power in ways—such as via normal succession or reshuffling among ruling elites—that do not convey strength so convincingly. We assess our claims by analyzing an original dataset of nondemocratic leader transitions. We show that accounting for the strength demonstrated during a leader's entry to power substantially improves our ability to predict how, and when, that leader will eventually leave office.

非民主国家领导人的夺权方式会对其政府稳定性产生何种影响？既往研究表明，非常规的领导人上位路径——即违反政权内部领导人遴选规范的夺权行为——往往预示着后续将发生违宪政权更迭。本文则主张，部分非常规夺权方式实则可帮助领导人规避被武力推翻的命运。当领导人依托强大且忠诚的支持者联盟，不仅推翻前任领导人，更彻底颠覆整个执政政权时，便会向所有潜在对手彰显自身执政实力。因此，通过成功叛乱、民众起义、大规模改朝换代政变等方式掌权的领导人，能够有效威慑后续的挑战，其被赶下台的概率远低于那些通过常规继任、统治精英内部洗牌等未如此有力地彰显实力的方式掌权的领导人。我们通过分析原创的非民主国家权力过渡数据集验证了上述研究主张，结果显示，考量领导人掌权时所展现的实力，可大幅提升我们预测该领导人最终以何种方式、在何时离任的能力。