Replication data for: Free Trade Agreements and the Consolidation of Democracy

We study the relationship between participation in free trade agreements (FTAs) and the sustainability of democracy. Our model shows that FTAs can critically reduce the incentive of authoritarian groups to seek power by destroying protectionist rents, thus making democracies last longer. This gives governments in unstable democracies an extra motive to form FTAs. Hence, greater democratic instability induces governments to boost their FTA commitments. In a dataset with 116 countries over 1960-2007, we find robust support for these predictions. They help to rationalize the rapid simultaneous growth of regionalism and of worldwide democratization since the late 1980s.

本研究旨在探讨自由贸易协定（Free Trade Agreements，FTAs）参与程度与民主可持续性之间的内在关联。我们构建的理论模型表明，自由贸易协定可通过消解贸易保护主义租金，显著削弱威权群体的夺权动机，从而延长民主政体的存续周期。这一机制为民主稳定性欠佳国家的政府参与自由贸易协定提供了额外的政策动因。据此，民主不稳定程度越高，政府便越会强化其自由贸易协定承诺。基于1960年至2007年涵盖116个国家的数据集，我们的实证分析为上述理论预测提供了稳健的支持证据。该研究结论可合理解释1980年代末以来区域主义与全球民主化同步快速扩张的现象。