Replication data for: The Effects of Different Types of Military Mobilization on the Outcome of International Crises

One dominant explanation for why crises escalate to war is based on misperception. Alternative rational explanations for why crises escalate to war are examined, including commitment problems, the cost of revealing military advantages, and a desire for greater future gains. These explanations for war argue that states are likely to prefer a military to a diplomatic solution and to mobilize their militaries to maximize a surprise attack advantage. This type of mobilization (private) is different from mobilization by states seeking a diplomatic advantage (public) because states are trying to avoid revealing information. When one state in a crisis mobilizes privately, war is more likely because one state is committed to conflict whereas the other is not receiving signals of an impending conflict. The effect of private mobilization on war is tested using the International Crisis Behavior data. The results demonstrate that private mobilization is likely to lead to war.

关于危机为何会升级为战争，主流解释之一聚焦于认知误判（misperception）。除此之外，学界亦对危机升级为战争的其他理性主义解释展开了探讨，涵盖承诺困境、暴露军事优势的代价，以及谋求未来更大收益的诉求。这类战争成因解释认为，国家往往更倾向于以军事手段而非外交途径解决危机，并会动员本国军队以最大化突袭优势。此类秘密动员（private mobilization）与各国为获取外交优势而开展的公开动员（public mobilization）存在显著差异，因发起秘密动员的国家意在避免暴露战略信息。当危机中的某一方进行秘密动员时，战争爆发的概率会显著提升——此时一方已决意开战，而另一方却未接收到任何迫在眉睫的冲突预警信号。研究借助国际危机行为数据集（International Crisis Behavior data），对秘密动员引发战争的效应展开了实证检验。实证结果表明，秘密动员确实会显著提升战争爆发的可能性。