Replication data for: Amici Curiae and Strategies for Gaining Access to the Supreme Court

In the process of case selection in the U.S. Supreme Court, lawyers try to secure space on the justices' plenary agenda; through briefs amicus curiae, interest groups try to advance their policy views. Thus, both seek access to the Court. What brings lawyers and organized interests together? In this article, I develop a model which examines when and why lawyers who represent petitioners build coalitions with groups. Using survey data from the 1986-87 Term of the Court, I show that lawyers-particularly lawyers with expertise in the agenda setting process-actively recruit the support of interests as amici curiae. Solicitation of amici most often occurs when lawyers and interest groups share similar goals, specifically, the desire for the justices to speak authoritatively on an issue of national importance. Consistent with the literature on organized interests, the results serve to explain why so few lawyers seek the support of amici curiae, despite their impact on the justices' decision making.

在美国最高法院的案件遴选流程中，律师们会竭力争取在大法官全体议事日程上获得发言席位；利益集团则通过提交法庭之友 (amicus curiae) 意见书来推行自身的政策主张。由此可见，二者均谋求获得最高法院的参与机会。究竟是什么因素将律师与有组织的利益集团联结在一起？本文构建了一个模型，用以探析代表请愿方的律师何时以及为何会与利益集团结成联盟。本文借助1986-1987年度最高法院开庭期的调研数据，证实了律师——尤其是精通议事日程设定流程的律师——会主动招揽利益集团作为法庭之友以获取其支持。法庭之友的招揽行为，最常发生在律师与利益集团目标一致之时，具体而言即双方均期望大法官就某项具有全国性重要意义的议题作出权威性表态。与现有关于有组织利益集团的研究文献相契合，本研究结果解释了为何尽管法庭之友意见书会对大法官的决策产生影响，但主动寻求其支持的律师却寥寥无几。