Replication Data for: Handmaidens of the Legislature? Understanding Regulatory Timing

When does legislation trigger regulation? The U.S. Congress regularly passes laws that authorize government agencies to write legally binding regulations. Yet, when this occurs, agencies may take years to act—or, at times—may never act at all. We theorize that the breadth of the congressional statutory delegation drives the timing of agency policy production. In particular, when Congress expressly tells an agency to promulgate a rule, we expect agencies to do so quickly. Yet, when Congress provides greater policymaking discretion to agencies, we expect other factors—and especially, internal agency considerations—to drive regulatory timing. We use data from almost 350 statutes spanning four decades, which are then matched up with thousands of regulations, to assess the argument. Using innovative methods, we find support for our hypotheses. Overall, we produce a deeper understanding of the link between delegation and discretion: suggesting when it occurs, as well as, importantly, why.

立法何时会触发监管？美国国会常会通过法案，授权政府机构制定具有法律约束力的监管规则。然而，即便获得此类授权，相关机构可能耗时数年才采取行动，有时甚至完全不会采取任何行动。

我们提出理论假说，认为国会法定授权的广度决定了机构政策制定的时间节点。具体而言，当国会明确要求某一机构颁布某项规则时，我们预期该机构会快速推进相关工作；而当国会赋予机构更大的政策制定裁量权时，监管行动的时间则会由其他因素——尤其是机构内部考量——主导。

我们采用跨越四十年、涵盖近350项法案的数据，并将其与数千项监管规则进行匹配，以此验证前述理论假说。通过创新性研究方法，我们的假说得到了实证支持。总体而言，本研究深化了对法定授权与裁量权之间关联的理解，阐明了二者关联的发生时机与核心动因。