Replication data for: Satisfaction Guaranteed: When Moral Hazard Meets Moral Preferences

The fear of moral hazard—especially in the age of Internet commerce—can depress or prevent profitable trades. Experiments show, however, that many people prefer honesty to deceit and would not succumb to moral hazard. This paper asks a whether we can find a simple, voluntary institution that can empower moral traders, drive out amoral ones, reduce moral hazard, and restore profitable trade to markets. I find that selling goods with a "satisfaction guarantee," accompanied by potentially minor legal or reputational enforcement, allows moral preferences to defeat moral hazard.

在互联网商务时代，对道德风险（moral hazard）的担忧可能会抑制甚至阻断盈利性交易的开展。然而实验研究表明，多数人更倾向于恪守诚实而非欺诈，并不会屈服于道德风险。本文旨在探究能否找到一种简便的自愿性制度安排，既能够赋能秉持道德准则的交易者，驱逐无道德操守的市场参与者，降低道德风险，同时让市场恢复盈利性交易的活力。研究发现，为商品附带"satisfaction guarantee"条款，并辅以适度的法律或声誉惩戒机制，即可借助道德偏好战胜道德风险。