Measuring Vote-Selling: Field Evidence from the Philippines

Using data from an anti-vote-buying field experiment we conducted in the Philippines, we report and validate a proxy measure for vote-selling. We demonstrate that our proxy measure, vote-switching, changes as expected with voter preferences and monetary offers from candidates. Voters are less likely to vote for someone different than their initial preference the larger the favorability rating difference between the preferred and alternative candidates. Similarly, vote-switching increases the more money the alternative candidate offers compared to the preferred candidates. We also describe the effects of the promise-based interventions on vote-switching, reported in full in a companion paper.

本研究依托我们在菲律宾开展的反选票售卖实地实验所获取的数据，报告并验证了一种用于衡量选票售卖行为的代理指标（proxy measure）。我们证实，本研究的代理指标——换票行为（vote-switching）——会按照预期随选民的初始投票偏好以及候选人提供的金钱报酬产生相应变化：当心仪候选人与替代候选人的好感度评分差距越大，选民转而支持与初始偏好不同的候选人的可能性就越低；同理，相较于心仪候选人，替代候选人提供的金钱报酬越高，选民的换票行为就越频繁。此外，我们还阐述了基于承诺的干预措施对换票行为的影响，相关完整细节已在一篇姊妹篇论文中予以呈现。