Replication Data for: Emergency Powers and the Heterogeneity of Terror in Democratic States

Terrorist violence has recently led several states to grant extraordinary powers to the executive. Yet scholars have only recently begun to examine whether the provision of such emergency powers influences the probability of future terrorist attacks. I argue that when democratic states grant emergency powers to the executive, domestic incentives can push leaders to take overly aggressive actions that are counterproductive for reducing future terrorist violence. However, these domestic incentives vary depending on the in-group or out-group nature of the terrorist group. I test this hypothesis using data on emergency power strength, states of emergency, and the frequency of terrorist violence. In a global sample of democratic states, I find that while emergency powers increase future attacks from out-group terror arising from separatist groups, they have no effect on terror from groups that reflect extreme positions within the political order. These results express the conditional nature of executive freedom in combatting terrorism.

近年来，恐怖主义暴力事件促使多国向行政部门授予非常规权力。然而，学界直至近年才开始探讨此类紧急权力的授予，是否会影响未来恐怖袭击的发生概率。本文主张，当民主国家向行政部门授予紧急权力时，国内激励因素可能会促使领导人采取过度激进的举措，反而不利于减少未来的恐怖主义暴力活动。不过，此类国内激励因素会因恐怖组织的内群体/外群体（in-group/out-group）属性而有所差异。本文采用紧急权力强度、紧急状态及恐怖暴力发生频次相关数据，对上述假说进行检验。在全球民主国家样本中，本文研究发现，紧急权力会加剧由分裂主义团体发起的外群体恐怖主义未来袭击频次，但对于反映政治秩序内部极端立场的团体所发动的恐怖活动则无显著影响。上述结果体现了行政部门在反恐行动中所拥有自由裁量权的条件性特征。