Replication Data for: When Technocratic Appointments Signal Credibility

How do prime ministers manage investors' expectations during financial crises? We take a novel approach to this question by investigating ministerial appointments. When prime ministers appoint technocrats, defined as non-partisan experts, they forgo political benefits and can credibly signal their willingness to pay down their debt obligations. This reduces bond yields, but only at times when the market is sensitive to expected repayments---i.e., during crises. To examine the theory, we develop an event study analysis that employs new data on the background of finance ministers in 21 Western and Eastern European democracies. We find that investors reward technocratic appointments by reducing a country's borrowing costs. Consistent with the theory, technocratic appointments under crises predict lower bond yields. Our findings contribute to the literature on the interplay of financial markets and domestic politics.

各国首相在金融危机期间应如何管理投资者预期？我们通过考察内阁部长任命行为，采用新颖的研究路径解答这一问题。当首相任命技术官僚（technocrats，即无党派专家）时，其将放弃政治收益，并可可信地传递出偿还债务义务的意愿。此举可降低一国的债券收益率，但仅在市场对预期偿债行为较为敏感的时期，也就是金融危机期间，才会生效。为验证上述理论，我们构建了事件研究法分析框架，并采用了涵盖21个西欧及东欧民主国家财政部长背景信息的全新数据集。研究结果显示，投资者会通过降低该国的融资成本，对技术官僚的任命作出正向反馈。与理论预期一致，金融危机期间的技术官僚任命确实预示着债券收益率的下行。本研究成果丰富了金融市场与国内政治互动领域的相关学术文献。