РЕЧІ І РЕЧОВІ ПРАВА: ВІД РИМСЬКОГО ПРАВА ДО СУЧАСНОГО ПРАВОРОЗУМІННЯ

The article by O. A. Khalabudenko traces the evolution of the concepts of “thing” and “real right” from Roman private law to contemporary civil‑law theory, showing their methodological significance for modern property law. The author argues that the classical Roman distinctions between res corporales and res incorporales, as well as between actio in rem and actio in personam, still structure the dogmatics of real rights, but cannot be mechanically transferred to current legal realities. On this basis, the paper reconstructs how proprietary logic gradually spread to various categories of patrimonial rights (including claims), and defends the view that the criteria for classifying rights as real or obligatory depend not on the physical nature of the object but on the mode of acquisition and the type of legal protection (erga omnes or relative effect).O. A. 哈拉布登科（O. A. Khalabudenko）的文章追溯了“物”与“物权（real right）”概念从罗马私法到当代民法学理论的演进历程，阐明了二者对现代物权法的方法论意义。作者指出，古典罗马法上的有体物（res corporales）与无体物（res incorporales）之分，以及对物之诉（actio in rem）与对人之诉（actio in personam）之别，至今仍塑造着物权教义学的基本框架，但无法被机械地套用于当下的法律现实。在此基础上，该文重构了物权逻辑如何逐步渗透至包括债权（claims）在内的各类财产权（patrimonial rights）范畴，并论证了如下观点：区分物权与债权的标准，并非取决于客体的物理属性，而是取决于权利的取得方式以及法律保护的类型——即对世效力（erga omnes）抑或相对效力（relative effect）。