Manipulation test applied to municipal elections

We evaluate whether political partisanship affects local taxes in an emerging economy. Using detailed residential property-level data in Chile, we study whether mayors’ political leanings affect the reassessment process and thus the taxes paid by home owners. In Chile, this type of tax is especially relevant since it is one of the largest sources of municipal income. To address endogeneity concerns, we use a regression discontinuity design, exploiting the quasi-experimental variation provided by close municipal elections. Our main results show that after a right-wing mayor is elected, property assessments increase up to 31% more than in a similar municipality where a left-wing mayor was elected. This effect cannot be fully explained by changes in prices or property characteristics.本研究旨在检验新兴经济体中政党派系立场是否会对地方税收产生影响。研究依托智利详细的住宅物业微观层面数据，探究市长的政治倾向是否会影响物业重估流程，进而影响房主的应缴税额。在智利，此类税收尤为关键，因其为市级财政收入的主要来源之一。为解决内生性偏误问题，本研究采用断点回归设计，借助竞争激烈的市级选举所提供的准实验变异场景。核心结果显示，右翼市长当选后，物业评估价值的涨幅较左翼市长执政的同类市政辖区高出最高达31%。该效应无法通过房价或物业特征的变化得到完全解释。