Replication data for: Comparing Judicial Selection Systems

Assuming that we desire to design formal rules that would maximize the attainment of the aims of creating a distinguished and independent bench, what would those rules look like? To address this question, we need not create new rules out of whole cloth. For the world’s democracies have devised, in the form of formal constitutional provisions and laws, a number of responses to the query we propose—responses that the vast majority of American scholars have not contemplated. In light of chronic complaints with the modes of appointment and retention of U.S. state and federal jurists, this void in our thinking is not just surprising; it is also unfortunate. For, before we weigh up the sorts of rules (much less the wholesale changes or even mere alterations in the existing rules that some scholars and policy makers have proposed) that might induce particular outcomes—be those outcomes a more distinguished judiciary, a more independent one, or both—ought we not consider the range of existing possibilities? Believing that the answer to this question must be in the affirmative, we undertake that consideration here. Specifically, we use the results of an inventory we conducted of formal judicial selection and retention systems currently in use in democratic societies throughout Europe to shed light on the sorts of institutions that may lead to a more distinguished and independent judiciary here, in the United States.

倘若我们旨在设计一套正式规则，以最大化实现打造卓越且独立的司法机构的目标，那么这些规则应当具备何种样貌？要解答这一问题，我们无需凭空创设全新的规则。因为全球民主国家已以正式宪法条款与法律的形式，针对我们提出的这一问题拟定了若干应对方案——而绝大多数美国学者尚未对这些方案加以考量。鉴于美国州级与联邦法官的任免与留任模式长期饱受诟病，我们学界的这一认知空白不仅令人意外，更属憾事。因为在我们评估那些可能催生特定结果的规则（更不必说部分学者与政策制定者所提议的对现有规则的全盘变革乃至细微调整）之前——无论这些结果是打造更卓越的司法体系、更独立的司法体系，抑或是二者兼具——我们难道不应先审视已有的各类可行方案吗？我们认为这一问题的答案必然是肯定的，因此本文将展开此项考量。具体而言，我们梳理了当前欧洲各民主国家所采用的正式法官选拔与留任制度（formal judicial selection and retention systems）的调研结果，以期阐明哪些制度架构能够助力美国打造更卓越且独立的司法体系。