Diplomacy Through Agents

Leaders generally conduct diplomacy through relatively autonomous agents. I argue that delegating diplomacy allows for credible communication by constraining leaders’ ability to bluff. Specifically, leaders can choose diplomats who place some value on the interests of their host countries. Such diplomats will only oppose foreign government policies when these impose large costs on their home country. Consequently, a message from such a diplomat enjoys greater credibility than one from a diplomat whose preferences mirror those of the leader. This gain in credibility increases the leader’s chances of obtaining concessions when the diplomat opposes foreign policies and reduces the probability of conflict. I show formally that, for the leader, the optimal diplomat is always biased in this way because the increased credibility offsets the diplomat’s occasional failure to support the leader’s position. I conclude with a case study focused on the career of Ambassador Walter Hines Page.

国家首脑通常依托具有相对自主性的外交代表开展外交活动。本文认为，将外交事务授权给外交代表，能够通过约束首脑的虚张声势能力，实现更具可信度的沟通。具体而言，首脑可以遴选一定程度上重视驻在国利益的外交官。这类外交官仅会在驻在国政策对其母国造成重大损失时，才会反对该外国政府的政策。因此，与偏好与首脑完全一致的外交官相比，这类外交官传递的讯息具备更高的可信度。这种可信度的提升，会在外交官反对外国政策时，增加首脑获取让步的几率，并降低冲突发生的可能性。本文通过形式化论证表明：对于首脑而言，最优的外交官人选始终具备这类偏向性——因为可信度的提升足以抵消外交官偶尔未能支持首脑立场的弊端。最后，本文以沃尔特·海因斯·佩奇（Walter Hines Page）大使的职业生涯为案例展开研究，作为全文的结语。