An agenda-based framework for multi-issue negotiation

This paper presents a new model for multi-issue negotiation under time constraints in an incomplete information setting. The issues to be bargained over can be associated with a single good/service or multiple goods/services. In our agenda-based model, the order in which issues are bargained over and agreements are reached is determined endogenously, as part of the bargaining equilibrium. In this context we determine the conditions under which agents have similar preferences over the implementation scheme and the conditions under which they have conflicting preferences. Our analysis shows the existence of equilibrium even when both players have uncertain information about each other, and each agent's information is its private knowledge. We also study the properties of the equilibrium solution and determine conditions under which it is unique, symmetric, and Pareto-optimal.

本文提出一种适用于不完全信息场景、带时间约束的多议题谈判新模型。待磋商的议题可关联单一商品/服务或多组商品/服务。在我们提出的基于议事日程的模型中，议题谈判与协议达成的顺序作为议价均衡的一部分由内生决定。在此框架下，我们明确了智能体（agent）对实施方案具备相似偏好的条件，以及双方存在偏好冲突的条件。我们的分析表明，即便博弈双方均掌握不确定的对方信息，且各智能体的信息均为其私有知识时，均衡依然存在。此外，我们还对均衡解的性质展开研究，并推导了均衡解满足唯一性、对称性与帕累托最优（Pareto-optimal）的条件。