Replication Data for: Protecting People from Natural Disasters: Political Institutions and Ocean-originated Hazards

Why do some leaders protect their citizens from natural disasters while others do not? This paper argues that leaders in large coalition systems provide more protection against natural disasters than leaders in small coalition systems. Yet autocrats also provide large-scale disaster protection if members of their winning coalition are exposed to natural hazards. The paper tests these propositions by examining cross-country variation in the number of sea level stations as a lower bound for protection against ocean-originated disasters. Empirical evidence indicates that leaders in large coalition systems deploy more sea level stations than their counterparts in small coalition systems. The evidence also shows that if the national capital is close to the coast, thus exposing members of the ruling coalition to ocean-originated hazards, leaders across political systems install more sea level stations.

为何部分国家领导人能够为本国民众提供自然灾害防护，而另一部分领导人却未能做到？本文认为，相较于小型执政联盟体系中的领导人，大型执政联盟体系的领导人会为民众提供更全面的自然灾害防护。但倘若执政联盟成员面临自然灾害风险，独裁者同样会开展大规模的灾害防护工作。本文以海平面监测站数量作为海洋源性灾害防护能力的下限衡量指标，通过考察跨国差异来检验上述命题。实证结果表明，大型执政联盟体系的领导人相较于小型执政联盟体系的同类政权领导人，会布设更多的海平面监测站。研究同时发现，若国家首都濒临海岸，致使执政联盟成员暴露于海洋源性灾害风险之中，所有政治体制的领导人都会增设更多的海平面监测站。