Data_Sheet_2_Effects of Instrumentality and Personal Force on Deontological and Utilitarian Inclinations in Harm-Related Moral Dilemmas.PDF

Moral dilemmas often concern actions that involve causing harm to others in the attempt to prevent greater harm. But not all actions of this kind are equal in terms of their moral evaluation. In particular, a harm-causing preventive action is typically regarded as less acceptable if the harm is a means to achieve the goal of preventing greater harm than if it is a foreseen but unintended side-effect of the action. Likewise, a harm-causing preventive action is typically deemed less acceptable if it directly produces the harm than if it merely initiates a process that brings about the harmful consequence by its own dynamics. We report three experiments that investigated to which degree these two variables, the instrumentality of the harm (harm as means vs. side-effect; Experiments 1, 2, and 3) and personal force (personal vs. impersonal dilemmas; Experiments 2 and 3) influence deontological (harm-rejection) and utilitarian (outcome-maximization) inclinations that have been hypothesized to underly moral judgments in harm-related moral dilemmas. To measure these moral inclinations, the process dissociation procedure was used. The results suggest that the instrumentality of the harm and personal force affect both inclinations, but in opposite ways. Personal dilemmas and dilemmas characterized by harm as a means evoked higher deontological tendencies and lower utilitarian tendencies, than impersonal dilemmas and dilemmas where the harm was a side-effect. These distinct influences of the two dilemma conceptualization variables went undetected if the conventional measure of moral inclinations, the proportion of harm-accepting judgments, was analyzed. Furthermore, although deontological and utilitarian inclinations were found to be largely independent overall, there was some evidence that their correlation depended on the experimental conditions.

道德困境通常涉及为阻止更大伤害而对他人造成伤害的行为。但此类行为在道德评价层面并非全然等同。具体而言，相较于将伤害作为预防更大伤害之手段的情形，若该伤害仅为行为可预见但未意图的附带后果，则此类造成伤害的预防行为通常被认为更具可接受性。同理，相较于仅启动一个由自身动态机制引发有害结果的过程，若行为直接造成伤害，则此类造成伤害的预防行为通常被认为更不可接受。
本研究报告三项实验，旨在探究伤害的工具性（伤害作为手段vs.附带后果；实验1、2、3）与个人力量（personal force，个人式vs.非个人式道德困境；实验2、3）这两个变量，对义务论（deontological，排斥伤害）倾向与功利论（utilitarian，结果最大化）倾向的影响程度——这两种倾向被假设为伤害相关道德困境中道德判断的潜在基础。
为测量此类道德倾向，本研究采用了过程分离范式（process dissociation procedure）。研究结果表明，伤害的工具性与个人力量均会对这两种倾向产生影响，但作用方向相反。相较于非个人式道德困境（impersonal dilemmas）以及以伤害为附带后果的道德困境，个人式道德困境（personal dilemmas）与以伤害作为手段的道德困境会引发更强的义务论倾向与更弱的功利论倾向。若仅采用传统的道德倾向测量方式——即接受伤害判断的比例——则无法检测到这两种困境概念化变量的独特影响。此外，尽管整体而言义务论倾向与功利论倾向在很大程度上相互独立，但亦有证据表明二者的相关性会因实验条件而异。