Replication Data for: A Story of Institutional Misfit: Congress and US Economic Sanctions

Parting from conventional studies on economic sanctions that look at the properties of the targeted state, this study focuses on the institutional origins of economic sanctions. I observe that most U.S. sanctions either originate from the legislative or the executive branch. Building on this observation, I argue and present evidence that the institutional origin of a U.S. sanction has a discernable effect on that sanction's duration. An institutional approach underpins the theory I develop to explain this difference. The veto-point approach focuses on the institutional inertia bestowed upon foreign policy actions executed through law, and suggests that sanctions imposed as law should last longer than those carried out by executive order. Semi-parametric duration analysis conducted on the recently released TIES data confirm this expectation.

过往有关经济制裁（economic sanctions）的研究多聚焦于受制裁国家的属性特征，本研究则突破既有研究范式，转而关注经济制裁的制度起源。本文观察到，绝大多数美国制裁措施均源自立法部门或行政分支。基于这一观察结论，本文提出核心论点并提供实证支撑：美国制裁的制度起源对其持续时长具有显著可辨的影响。本文用以解释该差异的理论体系，以制度分析路径为核心依托。否决点路径（veto-point approach）聚焦于通过法律程序实施的外交政策行动所附带的制度惰性，并提出推论：以立法形式出台的制裁，其持续时长应长于以行政命令推行的制裁。基于最新公开的TIES数据集开展的半参数持续期分析（semi-parametric duration analysis），验证了上述理论预期。