Replication data for: Efficient Bailouts?

We develop a quantitative equilibrium model of financial crises to assess the interaction between ex post interventions in credit markets and the buildup of risk ex ante. During a systemic crisis, bailouts relax balance sheet constraints and mitigate the severity of the recession. Ex ante, the anticipation of such bailouts leads to an increase in risk-taking, making the economy more vulnerable to a financial crisis. We find that moral hazard effects are limited if bailouts are systemic and broad-based. If bailouts are idiosyncratic and targeted, however, this makes the economy significantly more exposed to financial crises.

我们构建了一个金融危机的定量均衡模型，以评估信贷市场事后干预与事前风险积累之间的相互作用。在系统性危机期间，救助举措可缓解资产负债表约束，减轻经济衰退的严重程度。事前而言，对这类救助的预期会提升风险承担水平，进而使经济体更易遭受金融危机冲击。我们发现，若救助举措具备系统性与广泛覆盖性，则道德风险（moral hazard）效应较为有限。但若救助举措具有异质性且针对性强，则会显著提升经济体面临金融危机的风险敞口。