Vertical intra-institutional effects of ministerial turnover in the Council of the European Union

How do high levels of ministerial turnover affect the strength of ministers and bureaucrats in the Council of the European Union? We test two rival hypotheses – one suggesting that high turnover rates will empower bureaucrats, the other suggesting that they will increase uncertainty and increase ministerial involvement. We empirically document high turnover among ministers in the Council. Next, we develop a conceptual framework that identifies four ways that turnover might affect institutional balances. Then we outline rival hypotheses about turnover’s vertical intra-institutional effects and present statistical models that gauge turnover’s effects on the power of ministers and bureaucrats. Our analysis supports the hypothesis that higher turnover is associated with lower levels of ministerial control. The article generates new insights into institutional dynamics and informs debates about the nature of European Union accountability.

部长人事高频率更迭，会对欧盟理事会（Council of the European Union）内部长与行政官僚的权力强度产生何种影响？本研究检验两组对立假说：其一提出高更迭率将赋能行政官僚，其二则认为高更迭会加剧不确定性，进而提升部长的介入程度。我们首先实证记录了欧盟理事会内部部长的高更迭现状。随后，我们构建概念框架，阐明人事更迭可能通过四种路径影响制度权力平衡。接着，我们梳理关于更迭的纵向制度内部效应的对立假说，并搭建统计模型以测算更迭对部长与行政官僚权力的作用效果。分析结果支持“更高的部长更迭率与更低的部长控制权显著相关”这一假说。本文为制度动态研究提供了新视角，也为有关欧盟问责机制本质的学术辩论提供了有益参考。