Replication data for: Ignorance Is Bliss: An Experimental Study of the Use of Ambiguity and Vagueness in the Coordination Games with Asymmetric Payoffs

We consider a game where one player, the Announcer, has to communicate the value of a payoff relevant state of the world to a set of players who play a coordination game with multiple equilibria. While the Announcer and the players agree that coordination is desirable, since the payoffs of the players at the equilibria are unequal, they disagree as to which equilibrium is best. We demonstrate experimentally that in such coordination games, in order to mask the asymmetry of equilibrium payoffs, it may be advantageous for a utilitarian benevolent Announcer to communicate in an ambiguous or vague manner. (JEL C71, D81, D83)

本文研究一类博弈场景：其中一名参与者（公告者，Announcer）需向一组参与者传递与收益相关的世界状态取值，而该组参与者正开展一场存在多重均衡的协调博弈。尽管公告者与所有参与者均认可协调博弈的收益优化目标，但由于不同均衡下参与者的收益并不均等，双方对于哪一均衡为最优的评判存在分歧。本文通过实验证实，在此类协调博弈中，为掩盖均衡收益的非对称性，一名秉持功利主义理念的善意公告者采用模糊或含糊的沟通方式或许更为有利。（JEL C71, D81, D83）