Local Competitive Authoritarianism and Post-Conflict Violence. An Analysis of the Assassination of Social Leaders in Colombia

The threat of continued violence is a primary concern in post-conflict societies. This article contributes to the literature on post-conflict violence by analyzing a specific phenomenon that has characterized Colombia since the signing of the 2016 peace agreement: the assassination of social leaders. Building on explanations that emphasize state weakness, illicit economies, and the role of illegal armed actors, we argue that the assassination of social leaders also responds to efforts by local elites to sustain local competitive authoritarian orders in the face of bottom-up threats to their power by sociopolitical actors mobilized around the local implementation of the peace agreement. Using a cross- sectional dataset of Colombian municipalities, we find that assassinations of social leaders are more likely and more frequent in municipalities with intermediate levels of party fragmentation and low levels of voter turnout – that is, in municipalities with restricted electoral competition. Furthermore, a higher share of votes for leftist parties, which signals the presence of challengers to local elites, correlates with a higher probability and a higher number of assassinations. Overall, this article suggests that the nature of local political orders constitutes a key dimension shaping the micro-dynamics of violence and repression in post-conflict contexts.

冲突后社会中，持续暴力威胁是首要关切议题。本文针对2016年和平协定签署以来哥伦比亚出现的标志性特殊现象——社会领袖遇刺事件展开分析，为冲突后暴力相关研究文献贡献了新的视角。本文基于既有强调国家治理薄弱、非法经济活动与非法武装组织作用的解释框架，进一步提出：社会领袖遇刺事件，实则是当地精英为维系本地竞争性威权秩序所采取行动的产物——这类秩序正面临着因和平协定本地落地而动员起来的社会政治行动者自下而上的权力挑战。通过使用哥伦比亚市级辖区的横截面数据集，本文研究发现：在政党分化程度处于中等水平、选民投票率偏低的市级辖区——即选举竞争受限的地区——社会领袖遇刺事件的发生概率更高、案发频次也更多。此外，左翼政党得票占比更高的地区（该指标预示着当地精英面临权力挑战者），其社会领袖遇刺的概率与案发数量同样更高。综上，本文表明，本地政治秩序的本质是塑造冲突后语境下暴力与镇压微观动态的关键维度。