Replication Data for: Just in time: Political policy cycles of land reform

Abstract: While the political budget cycle literature focuses on the manipulation of existing policies, an analysis of the impact of the passage of redistributive policies themselves remains absent. I contend that policy passage is a strategically timed signal to voters used before elections to benefit the incumbent. Using aggregate data on land reforms in India from 1957 to 1992, I find that reforms are indeed timed before elections. Second, using historical survey data, I show that land issues remain a strong signal to Indian voters over time, even in states that have already enacted reforms. These findings provide evidence for political policy cycles.

摘要：现有政治预算周期（political budget cycle）相关研究多聚焦于对既有政策的操纵，却鲜有针对再分配政策（redistributive policies）本身获批所产生影响的分析。本文提出，政策获批是现任执政者在选举前为谋求自身选举优势，向选民传递的经过战略时机选择的信号。本文采用1957年至1992年印度土地改革（land reforms）的汇总数据，研究发现土地改革确实会被安排在选举前的时间窗口推行。其次，通过历史调研数据，本文证实，即便在已推行土地改革的印度邦，土地议题长期以来仍是印度选民的重要投票信号。上述研究结果为政治政策周期（political policy cycles）提供了实证支撑。