Manipulation test applied to municipal elections

We evaluate whether political partisanship affects local taxes in an emerging economy. Using detailed residential property-level data in Chile, we study whether mayors’ political leanings affect the reassessment process and thus the taxes paid by home owners. In Chile, this type of tax is especially relevant since it is one of the largest sources of municipal income. To address endogeneity concerns, we use a regression discontinuity design, exploiting the quasi-experimental variation provided by close municipal elections. Our main results show that after a right-wing mayor is elected, property assessments increase up to 31% more than in a similar municipality where a left-wing mayor was elected. This effect cannot be fully explained by changes in prices or property characteristics.

本研究旨在探究政治党派立场是否会对新兴经济体的地方税收产生影响。依托智利详尽的住宅物业微观数据，本研究考察市长的政治倾向是否会影响房产估值调整流程，进而影响房主需缴纳的税款。在智利，此类税收尤为重要，因其为市级财政收入的主要来源之一。为解决内生性顾虑，我们采用断点回归设计，借助势均力敌的市级选举所提供的准实验性外生变异。核心研究结果显示，右翼市长当选后，物业估值的涨幅较左翼市长当选的同类市政辖区高出至多31%。该效应无法完全由房价变动或房产属性变化所解释。