Data and Code for: Coase and Cap-and-Trade: Evidence on the Independence Property from the European Carbon Market

I examine the Coasean independence property in a large multinational cap-and-trade scheme for greenhouse gas emissions, the EU Emissions Trading System. I analyze whether emissions of power producers are independent from allowance allocations by leveraging a change in allocation policy for a difference-in-differences strategy. The evidence suggests that the independence property holds overall and for larger emitters and that firms respond to the loss in allocation by increasing allowance purchases. Suggestive evidence for small emitters indicates that trading costs or behavioral bias distort their emission decisions. However, their small emission share leaves the independence property intact at the sector level.<br><br>

本文针对全球规模最大的跨国温室气体排放总量控制与交易机制——欧盟碳排放交易体系（EU Emissions Trading System），考察了其中的科斯独立性属性（Coasean independence property）。本文依托配额分配政策的变动，采用双重差分法（difference-in-differences），检验电力生产商的排放量是否与配额分配相互独立。

实证结果表明，整体层面以及大型排放主体均符合该独立性属性；企业会通过增加配额购买量来应对配额减少的局面。针对小型排放主体的初步实证结果显示，交易成本或行为偏差会扭曲其排放决策，但由于小型排放主体的排放量占比较低，行业层面的科斯独立性属性仍保持完好。