Replication data for: Outside-In: The Effects of External Threat on State Centralization. Journal of Conflict Resolution August 2010 vol. 54 no. 4 519-542

Although centralization is thought to be a common response to external threats to the state, few theories develop the mechanisms by which domestic centralization occurs. Fewer still consistently demonstrate that centralization is indeed a common response to external threats in all states. This article therefore develops a comprehensive theory of domestic change in the shadow of external threat. Salient threats to the state create strong incentives for opposition forces to support the leader in power, even in non-democracies. The leadership then uses these favorable domestic political climates to decrease the number of institutional veto points that can stop future leader-driven policy changes. Collectively, this two-part theory provides a unified model of domestic behavioral change (also known as rally effects) and institutional centralization (defined by a declining number of veto players). In addition, by defining salient threats as challenges to homeland territory, the article provides some of the first domestic-level evidence that territorial disputes are fundamentally different from other types of international conflicts.

尽管学界普遍认为集权化是国家应对外部威胁的常规策略，但鲜有理论系统阐释国内集权化的形成机制，更少有理论能够一致证明，所有国家的国内集权化确实是应对外部威胁的普遍反应。为此，本文构建了一套关于外部威胁阴影下国内政治变迁的综合理论。国家面临的显著外部威胁，会为反对势力支持现任当权者提供强劲激励——即便在非民主政体中亦是如此。随后，执政者便会利用这一有利的国内政治氛围，削减能够阻挠未来领导人主导政策变革的制度否决点数量。这套两阶段理论共同构成了一套统一的分析模型，涵盖国内行为变化（亦称集会效应（rally effects））与制度集权化（以否决玩家（veto players）数量的下降为定义依据）两大范畴。此外，本文将显著外部威胁界定为对本国领土的挑战，从而首次提供了部分基于国内层面的实证证据，证明领土争端与其他类型的国际冲突存在本质差异。