Replication data for: Affirmative Action: One Size Does Not Fit All

This paper identifies a new reason for giving preferences to the disadvantaged using a model of contests. There are two forces at work: the effort effect working against giving preferences and the selection effect working in favor of them. When education is costly and easy to obtain (as in the United States), the selection effect dominates. When education is heavily subsidized and limited in supply (as in India), preferences are welfare reducing. The model also shows that unequal treatment of identical agents can be welfare improving, providing insights into when the counterintuitive policy of rationing educational access to some subgroups is welfare improving. (JEL H52, H75, I23, I28, J15, O15)

本文通过竞赛模型论证了优待弱势群体的全新动因。存在两股相互作用的作用力：其一为反对优待政策的努力效应（effort effect），其二为支持优待政策的甄选效应（selection effect）。当教育成本高昂且获取门槛较低时（如美国），甄选效应占据主导地位；当教育获得高额补贴且供给受限时（如印度），优待政策会降低社会总福利。该模型还表明，对同质个体实施差别对待可提升社会福利，为理解“对部分群体配给教育准入这一反直觉政策何时能改善社会福利”提供了理论视角。（JEL分类号：H52、H75、I23、I28、J15、O15）