Asset Sales, Firm Performance, and the Agency Costs of Managerial Discretion
收藏NBER1994-02-01 更新2025-01-04 收录
下载链接：
https://www.nber.org/papers/w4654
下载链接
链接失效反馈官方服务：
资源简介：
We argue that management sells assets when doing so provides the cheapest funds to pursue its objectives rather than for operating efficiency reasons alone. This hypothesis suggests that (1) firms selling assets have high leverage and/or poor performance, (2) a successful asset sale is good news and
我们提出，当出售资产能够为管理层实现其目标提供成本最低的资金来源时，管理层便会实施资产出售，而非单纯出于运营效率层面的考量。本假说可推导出如下两点推论：(1) 实施资产出售的企业普遍具有较高的杠杆率且/或经营绩效不佳；(2) 成功完成资产出售属于正向市场利好消息，并且
提供机构：
美国国家经济研究局
创建时间：
1994-02-01
