The problem of school enrollment rules: what can be changed in the largest city in Brazil

Abstract School choice is an issue little studied in Brazil, despite its huge importance, especially in the USA. In this paper, using game theory, how students are allocated in municipality of São Paulo is analyzed. As students ‘preferences are not taken into account, the São Paulo system does not meet the main qualities of an allocation mechanism: stability, non-manipulation and efficiency. Alternatively, the use of the Gale-Shapley mechanism is proposed. Simulations are performed confirming theoretical results and also indicating a huge potential for improvement in the system.

摘要 择校问题尽管重要性极高，尤其在美国已是广受关注的议题，但在巴西却鲜有相关研究。本文运用博弈论，对圣保罗市的学生分配机制展开分析。由于现行体系未考量学生的偏好，圣保罗市的学生分配系统并不符合优质分配机制应具备的三大核心属性：稳定性、不可操纵性与效率。对此，本文提出采用盖尔-沙普利机制（Gale-Shapley mechanism）作为替代方案。通过仿真实验验证了相关理论结论，同时表明该系统存在极大的改进潜力。