Replication Data for: Courts as extra-cabinet control mechanisms for secondary legislation: evidence from Italy

Ministers can have an incentive to adopt policies through secondary legislation that deviates from the gen- eral compromise reached via the primary legislation. We suggest that when secondary legislation is at stake, in some countries coalition partners can rely upon the ex-ante legal scrutiny of courts as an extra-cabinet control mechanism. We focus on the interaction between governments and the Council of State, the highest administrative court and the most important consultative body of the government in Italy. Our findings support the general hypothesis that the Council’s activism as an advisor is generated by the demand for control mechanisms on the secondary legislation. Such a demand is affected by specific political conditions, i.e. the level of government heterogeneity and government alternation. The findings on the Italian case can be a starting point for research on the different levels of involvement of adminis- trative courts in the executive politics that characterize European Democracies.

部长们可能会存在通过次级立法（secondary legislation）推行政策的激励，而该类次级立法偏离了经由初级立法（primary legislation）所达成的总体妥协共识。我们提出，当次级立法面临争议时，部分国家的执政联盟伙伴可将法院的事前法律审查（ex-ante legal scrutiny）作为一种内阁外监督机制（extra-cabinet control mechanism）加以依托。我们的研究聚焦于意大利政府与国务委员会（Council of State）之间的互动关系——该委员会既是该国最高行政法院，亦是政府最重要的咨询机构。我们的研究结果支持如下总体假说：国务委员会作为咨询者的能动主义表现，源于针对次级立法的监督机制需求。此类需求受到特定政治条件的影响，具体包括政府异质性（government heterogeneity）程度与政府更迭（government alternation）状况。针对意大利案例的研究结果，可为探讨行政法院在欧洲民主国家所典型的行政政治中的参与程度差异的相关研究提供起点。