Scoring and Cartel Discipline in Procurement Auctions

Auctioneers suspecting bidder collusion often lack the formal evidence needed for legal recourse. A practical alternative is to design auctions that hinder collusion. Since Abreu et al. (1986), economic theory has emphasized imperfect monitoring as a constraint on collusion, but evidence remains怀疑存在投标人串通（bidder collusion）的拍卖师，往往难以获取用于法律追责的正式证据。一种切实可行的替代方案，便是设计能够有效抑制串通行为的拍卖机制。自阿布雷乌等人（Abreu et al.，1986）的研究以来，经济学理论始终将不完美监测（imperfect monitoring）视作制约串通行为的核心约束条件，但相关实证证据仍有待完善。