Replication data for: Do Economic Sanctions Destabilize Country Leaders?
收藏DataONE2015-04-11 更新2024-06-27 收录
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资源简介:
Do economic sanctions destabilize the governments they target? A form of foreign pressure, sanctions are typically meant to alter the policies of other countries. There is much pessimism on whether they ever work. This article shows that economic pressure works in at least one respect: it destabilizes the leaders it targets. I present a theoretical argument that explains why destabilization is a necessary condition for successful coercion. I find evidence that pressure destabilizes in a large panel of cross-country time-series data. The destabilization finding indicates that sanctions may be more effective at altering policies than we think. I conclude by noting that greater optimism regarding the effectiveness of sanctions should be balanced by a careful consideration of the policy's real and sizeable costs for those caught in the middle.
经济制裁会动摇其制裁目标国的政府吗?作为一种外部施压手段,经济制裁的核心目标通常是改变他国的政策走向。学界对于其实际有效性始终存在诸多质疑。本文研究证实,经济施压至少在一个维度上确有成效:它会动摇受制裁国家的执政者地位。本文提出一套理论阐释框架,用以说明为何动摇执政者地位是成功实现强制目标的必要条件。基于大规模跨国面板时序数据集的实证分析,本文找到了经济施压能够动摇执政者地位的可靠证据。这一关于执政者地位动摇的研究发现表明,经济制裁在改变他国政策方面的实际效果可能远超此前的认知。本文最后指出,在对经济制裁的效用持更为乐观态度的同时,也应当审慎考量该政策对受波及的中立群体所造成的真实且高昂的代价。
创建时间:
2023-11-20



